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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DAVID McMURDIE, WILLIAM WHITTAKER, CAROL WHITTAKER, and
DENISE WHITTAKER, by her Guardian
Ad Litem, Willian1 Whittaker,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

-vs.-

Case No.

8894

ALVIN UNDERWOOD, JOSEPH JOHNSON, H. E. WOOLF, and NORTH
AMERICAN VAN LINES,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
H. E. WOOLF AND NORTH AMERICAN VAN LINES

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This was a suit for personal injuries instituted by the
present appellants against the respondents and against
certain additional defendants who were included in the
suit because one of thein, MrH. Nancy Dillingham Olsen,
was the driver of the car which crashed into appellants'
automobile.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
l\!lr~.

Olsen, her husband, and his ernplo:·er, Frontier

Sales, a corporation, rnade an independent settlernent ·with
appellants iunnediately prior to trial and thereafter, they
were disrnissed from the action upon motion of appellants.
The suit was then tried as against the respondents herein
and resulted in a jury verdict of no cause of action in the
District Court of Salt Lake County with Judge Merrill
C. Faux presiding.
A motion for new trial 'vas filed, argued and denied.
This appeal followed.
These respondents cannot accept appellants' staternent of fact because it is incomplete and is in conflict
with the fundarnental principle that the Supreme Court
should be asked to "consider those facts that nwst strongly support the verdict, where there is evidence pointing
in different directions." ill orley Y. Rodberg, (l~tah 1958)
323 P. 2d 717. These respondents accordingly will set
forth a different statement of facts.
S~rATEl\1EXT

OF F ~.\.CT~

rrhe accident occurred at about 1 :15 a.rn. December
15, 1936, on a straight stretch of U.S. Highway -!0 at a
point about eleven rniles north of Tooele and about one
rnile west of what is known as Lake Point near the TooeleSalt Lake County line. The highwa~· at that point is
northeast and southwest in direction. For approximately
two and one-half rniles the road is straight and the accident happened in the approxirnate center of that length
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of straight road, (R. 222) when a pick-up truck, driven by
Mrs. Olsen, srnashed into the rear of a stopped car occupied by appellants.
At this point, the road had a total hard surface of
33 feet of which 30 feet was for travel and l¥2 feet on
each side was separated from the travel portion by a solid
yellow guide line. The lanes for opposing traffic were
designated by an irregular white line down the center
of the road (Ex. 6-D). There was practically no shoulder
and the Highway Patrol Officer testified "we would
consider that as a no-shoulder highway" (R. 227). He
defined this term to mean that the hard surface was built
out to the extreme edge of the road and from the hard
surface the road dropped down into a "burrow pit."
vVhat shoulders there were, were wet and muddy due to
a previous rain (R. 227).
Prior to the accident a large van-type truck going in
a northeasterly direction toward Salt Lake City experienced difficulty with its lights so that its driver apparently felt required to pull over to the side of the road in
order to repair them. This van has been designated
throughout the case as Unit No.1. It has not otherwise
been identified and neither its owner nor its driver has
been narned as a defendant herein.
Unit No. 2, a tractor-trailer combination owned by
the defendant Johnson and driven by his employee Underwood, was also proceeding toward Salt Lake City. Underwood saw the first truck and, realizing that it was in
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trouble, he pulled to a stop approxin1ately 150 feet ahead
of the front of Unit No.1 and went back to see if he could
assist the driver of No. 1.
Underwood left his lights and clearance lights on
and walked back to the disabled truck. In a few moments,
he was able to repair the electrical circuit which caused
t~1e truck lights to go on. Just before the repairs were
completed, a third truck, referred to in this case as Unit
No. 3, owned by North American Van Lines and driven
by the respondent H. E. Woolf, came upon the scene from
the west and, seeing that there \Yas some difficulty, \Voolf
pulled ahead of Truck No. 2 approximately the same distance as No. 2 had pulled ahead of K o. 1 and got out to
see if he could be of assistance. By the tin1e he walked
back to No. 1, its lights were on and all three truck drivers
then started for their trucks to drive away (R. :291, :29:2).
Unit No. 1 had been pulled off of the paved portion
of the road as far as could be driven without tipping the
truck over and, in fact, l ~nit X o. 1 was described by all
witnesses as ''tilting" over to the burrow pit side of the
road. Units No. 2 and No.3 were not parked so they tilted
hut the~' were over as far as they could safely be driven
(R. 276). In fact, appellant \Yillirun \Yhittaker, a truck
driver of sorne twenty years' experience, conceded that
the two trucks were "stopped in the highway because
they couldn't get off" (R. 187. 1~~).
The investigating trooper of the Utah Highway
Patrol described the steepness of the area at the edge of
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the hard surfaee of the road and stated it would be "un\rise'' to drive on that area when it is wet (R. 228).
Appellants had been cmning from California to Salt
Lake City in a Nash autonwbile owned and driven by
\Villiam \\'hittaker. vVhen Whittaker was about one-half
mile away, (R. 172) he saw the lights of the trucks ahead
including blinker lights and red lights (R. 204). He
realized there was smne difficulty so he began to slow
down.
When he went by the tilted van, Unit No. 1, he had
reduced his speed to four or five miles an hour. There
were cars coming from the opposite direction and they
had also slowed down because of the apparent trouble
(R. 195).
Although apparently there was room for Whittaker's
passenger car to pass Unit No. 2 without crossing the
center line of the highway (R. 235) he elected to stop
behind Cnit No. 2 until he had a better opportunity to
pass.
While Whittaker was stopped, a man at the scene
(apparently YV oolf, driver of No. 3) was walking along
carrying a lighted flare and he suddenly dived under Unit
Xo. 2 (R. 195, 201). This caused Whittaker to look in his
rear-view mirror to see what caused the man to dive for
safety and it was then that Whittaker saw the Olsen pickup truck bearing down on hi1n frmn the rear. At this, he
pressed harder and harder on his brake pedal, which
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activated his large red stop lights on the rear of his ear.
He was "trying to do everything" he could to draw the attention of

~Irs.

Olsen to hi1n, but without success (R. 180).

Although the right side of the highway had some 161f2
feet of hard surface (Ex. 6-D), it was fully occupied by
Unit No.2 and by the Whittaker car, which was back of
and to the left of Unit 2. Whittaker described his position relative to No. 2 as "right behind his rear duals on
the left side which would be towards the 1niddle line. I
was straddling his rear duals" (R. 141).
Since there was traffic in the opposing lane, and
the right side was fully occupied by Whittaker and l~nit
No. 2, Mrs. Olsen had no part of the highway open to her
(R. 202). Despite the red and white lights and the blinker
lights on all the trucks, despite the large red lights on
Whittaker's Nash and his blinking turn signal, :Mr~.
Olsen never observed or realized the danger until too
late. Her car left only eight feet of skid marks before
in1pact (R. 22G). The i1npact propelled the Nash forward
in to the rear of llnit X o. :2. The X ash "·as totally denwlished.
Her only explanation for haYing failed to observe
the car and truck blocking her lane of travel was that
before she reached the area, she "just saw a bunch of
lights frmn further down the road and as I crune closer,
I thought that unit was nwving ... I thought the unit was
moving be<·ausP

\\"e

were on an open highway" (R. 252).
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\Vhen t::>he got closer to the truck, she saw it was not
moving. She then "went out to go around it." She saw
oncoming traffic so she "tried to go back in" ( R. 254).
rrhen, for the first time, she saw the Whittaker car.
8he couldn't remember whether it1:i lights were on. She
could only say: " ... I just saw it as one big thing" (R.
:25±).
Unit No. 3, which was the van driven by respondent
H. E. \V oolf and owned by North American Van Lines,
was a considerable distance ahead of No. 2. It was variously estin1ated as being from 100 to 150 feet from the
front of No. 2, and since the latter was 49 feet long, it
is clear No. 3 was far removed from the impact area,
which was at the rear of No. 2 (R. 234, 159).
It was claimed by appellants, however, that Woolf
should have parked off the highway and even farther
ahead of No. 2 because he should have foreseen that parking where he did 1night constitute a trap (R. 35).
Woolf and North American Van Lines contended that
their van was properly parked but that even if it had
not been, its position in no way contributed to the cause
of the accident, particularly since no one could reasonably
have foreseen the intervening acts or omissions of Mrs.
Olsen (R. 36).
These issues were framed in the trial court's instructions to the jury and resulted in a verdict in favor of
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the~e

respondents and against appellants, "no cause of
action" (R. 113).
STAr:L,E~lE~T

OF POINTS

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY AND ITS VERDICT IS OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY AND ITS VERDICT IS OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTED BY THE RE·CORD.

Although appellants have presented five separate
points in their Statement of Points, they have discussed
in their Argument alleged errors of the trial court in
fourteen separate particulars, relating to an equal number of instructions and, in addition, have urged that the
respondents were guilty of a violation of regulations
of the Interstate Comn1erce Conunission, ·which allegation wa~ never Inade until after the case had been pretried, tried to a jury and an adverse verdict received.
In view of this ''shotgun'' attack upon the trial court's
rulings, \\·e find it difficult to narrow and define appellants' contentions. Th(>refore, these respondents will
attempt to demonstrate that the trial court ruled correctly
on appellanb' reque~ted instrurtions and correctly instructed the ,jur~· concerning the principles of law appli<'ctble to this ease.
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\Ve will devote no tin1e to the argu1nent set forth
under appellants' point 2 "Which is to the effect that the
court erred by refusing to instruct the jury "on foreseeabilit~· of parking as constituting a trap or danger."
This clai1n will not be discussed further for the
reason that the trial court, by its instruction No. 16,
squarely subrnitted that issue to the jury and, under
familiar doctrine, appellants cannot complain merely
because the language of their requested instruction differed from that actually used by the court.
Appellants' contention that the case is governed or
controlled by regulations of the Interstate Commerce
{jomn1ission need not be considered in this Court, for it
was never injected into the trial in the court below. The
purported regulations were never offered in evidence, no
requests were made to instruct the jury about them, and
the trial proceeded solely upon the issues as set forth
at pre-trial.
The first 1nention of I.C.C. regulations occurred upon
the argument on appellants' motion for new trial.
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, contemplates
a "new trial ... on all or part of the issues ... " (italics
ours). This seems clearly to mean that there can be a
revie\\. only of issues which were actually tried by the
jury. No reason was offered to the trial court, and none
is mentioned here, why settled procedure should be disregarded or why appellants should be pennitted to rely
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upon clailns against which respondents had no opportunity to defend.
Appellants first coinplain that the court erred in its
instruction 27 because, it is said, the instruction took from
the jury "any question of concurrent contributing negligence ... and whether defendants' negligence was a contributing proximate cause." (Brief, page ±.)
~rhe

instruction under attack reads:

"You are instructed that the driver of the
pickup truck was negligent as a matter of law,
and if you find that she observed the hazards, if
any, of the stopped vehicles upon the highway
or under the circun1stances should have observed
said vehicles, but because of her negligence failed
to do so in ti1ne to avoid said accident, then you
are instructed that the negligence on her part was
the sole proxi1nate cause of the collision, and your
verdict n1ust be in favor of the defendants and
against the plaintiffs, no cause of action."
This instruction h)· the court is a correct statement
of Utah law as expressed by the Supre1ne Court in decisiom~ over a period of 1nore than thirty years.
For example, in llaar~trich Y. Oregon Short Line
Com1mny (1927) 70 Utah 552 262 P. 100, a train of cars
was being backed aero~~ Beck Street in Salt Lake City
and it was daiuted that the railroad did not light the ear~
and was otherwi~P nPgligent hPeanse it failed to give a
\\'arning of the presenc<.' of tlw train. The evidence disdosed ph~·sical facts revealing that the driver of an on-
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eoming car had ample time for observation of the train.
lt was held that there 'vas no issue for the jury on causa-

tion because the proxi1nate cause of the accident was
the conduct of the automobile driver and any failure of
the railroad to cmnply with the law "had nothing whatever to do with the accident and was in no sense the
proxlinate cause of plaintiff's injury."
Jlore recent cases have held to the same view. In
Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Company (Utah 1953) 263

P.:2d

2~7,

a truck was parked on 27th South Street in

Salt Lake City. The rear end of the truck extended five
feet into the paved portion of a twelve foot lane of travel.
The car in which the deceased was riding struck the rear
of the truck. The driver of the truck was found negligent and his negligence was found to have joined with the
conduct of the car driver in causing the accident.
However, the court drew attention to what it called
"a clear-cut distinction between two classes of cases."
The first is, "where one has negligently created a dangerous condition (such· as parking the truck) and a later
actor observed, or circurnstances are such that he could
not fail to observe, but negligently failed to avoid it."
In such a situation the Court said that it is "held as a
matter of law that the later intervening act does interrupt the natural se<1uence of events and cut off the legal
effect of the negligence" of the person who parked the
truck.
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The Court went on to say that in the second class of
case~, a jury question exists, " ... on the rationale that
it can reasonably be anticipated that circumstances may
arise wherein others Inay not observe the dangerous
condition until too late to escape it."
The opinion in the Hillyard cases further observes
that if the evidence was such as to make mandatory a
finding that the car driver must have seen the truck as he
approached, "but nevertheless ran into it, that \\Tould have
been something so unusual and extraordinary as not to be
reasonably foreseeable. In such instance, his negligence
would have been an independent intervening cause, insulating defendant's negligence as a proximate cause ... "
In the present case, there was no claiin that :Mrs.
Olsen's view was obstructed or that something prevented
her frmn seeing the danger earlier. \Vhittaker had slowed
because of all of the lighted trucks and he can1e to a stop
in the driving lane with all of his lights ablaze. He could
give no reason vvhy .Jirs. Olsen failed to see the situation,
and he conceded he "could have" said at the scene that the
accident "was caused b~~ the blankety-blank fool in the
pickup" ( 1\. 194). and he justified this state1nent by saying, "\Yell, I seen the lights and I pulled up and stopped .. ,
After reviewing Instruction K o. :27 in the light of the
record, it is difficult to ~ee how the trial court in this
case could havP better infonned the jury of the law concerning this ea~w. A careful examination of the testin1ony
of l\lrs. 01::-;pn reveals no indication of any other kind of
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negligen<~e \Vhich could have had an effect upon this case.

Her only explanation for her failure to see the highway
in front of her and that it was blocked was to the effect
that she had thought that the trucks were rnoving because
··we were on an open highway."
rrhis can be no answer to a claim of negligence. The
~upreme Court of Utah has rejected such a contention
in a case less than a year old. In Hirschbach v. Dubuque
Packing Company (Utah 1957) 316 P. 2d 319, the court
said:
"The duty and opportunity of a driver of a
vehicle on the highway is usually fully as great
to avoid running into a vehicle which is moving
in the sarne direction as it is where such second
vehicle is parked on the highway. The fact that
the taillights were burning would clearly increase
the opportunity of the driver of the oncoming
vehicle to discover, evaluate the situation and
avoid running into a vehicle which was parked on
the highway in front of him."
Since Mrs. Olsen's explanation of the accident fails
to reveal that she was confronted with an emergency,
and since the evidence is conclusive that she could and
should have seen the vehicles on the road ahead of her,
we submit that this case is governed by the principles of
the first class of cases discussed in the Hillyard case
and Mrs. Olsen'~ conduct was a "later intervening act''
which interrupted the "natural sequence of events and
cut off the legal effect" of the conduct of those who
parked the trucks.
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Instruction No. 27 states this principle accurately and
completely. It simply told the jury that if Mrs. Olsen
failed to see the vehicles because of her negligence, then
her failure was the sole proximate cause of the accident.
This is but another ·way of stating the doctrine set forth
in the Hillyard case.
Therefore, these respondents assert that even tf i1
have been found that 1Ir. \Yoolf parked his truck
on the highway in a negligeni manner, it was the latei
ac~ ~f M:r;:. OlsE·n who ("ne~di~·Pntly failed to avoid .. thf
trucks upon the highway which "cut off the legal effect"
of any negligence on the part of ~Ir. \Yoolf.
cou~d

In a case decided early this year the Supreme Court
of Utah again affirmed the doctrine which is contained
within the court's instructions in the present case. In
Lewis v. Savage (February 1958) 322 P.2d 152, a truck
was parked on a four lane highway and for purposes
of its opinion the court assu1ned, \\ithout deciding the
question, that the truck was unla\vfully parked. The court
held:
'' \Vhere, as in this case. the parking of the
truck created no danger or hazard to others using
the highway who used any ordinary caution to see
and avoid collis,ivus u·itllz substantial objects plainly visible on the higlzwa.tl in front of them, the
court's finding that the negligenee of such other
driver was the sole proxilnate cause of the accident wa~ reasonable and an1pl~· supported by the
evidence." (En1phasis supplied.)
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Appellant~' final argu1nents see1n to attack the trial

court's interpretation of Utah statutes governing parking of motor vehicles on the highway and the placement
of flares around disabled vehicles.
~edion

41-6-153, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states,
in substance, that the driver of a disabled vehicle must
place flares or other warning devices on the highway in
the night hours. Section 41-6-101 prohibits parking on the
paved portion of a highway when it is practical to park
off that part of the highway.

Ignoring the plain legislative intent of these sections,
and overlooking the principle that legislative language
should be interpreted to give effect to the plain meaning
of the words, appellants say: "The mere fact that the
defendant (sic) were not disabled does not relieve them''
from the responsibility to put out flares.
The obvious answer is that if the legislature had intended to require all trucks stopping on the highway to
put out flare~, whether disabled or not, it would have
said so, particularly since the statutes are specific and
detailed concerning truck specifications, equipment and
operation.
Even if it were pennissible for this Court to legislate
as appellants ask it to do, we submit that it would be
highly unreasonable to require a driver in the position of
respondent Woolf to put out flares before he could walk
back down the road to inquire about the trouble with the
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tilted truck. It is cornmon knowledge that trucks must
stop repeatedly to check tires and other equipment and
if flares are to be placed at each stop, they would soon
be viewed as commonplace, rather than as the warnings
which our present law contemplates.
Appellants further contend, however, that a duty to
place flares exist::; independent of statute and it is said
the trial court erred in failing to recognize that the respondents had such a duty-a "common law duty to
warn."
This argument fails for two reasons. First, appellants' requested instructions on the subject of flares (R.
37, 7:), 74) ·were all couched in statutory language, with
statutory citations, and the present argument, therefor~
earns the dubious distinction of an afterthought.
Second, the trial court granted appellants' request
No. 11, which is the only request even renwtely corresponding to their present argun1ent, and subn1itted it to
the jun· exaetl~· as requested. Thi~ was Instruction Xo.
16, which was not linrited to flares, but allowed the jury
to detennine whether parking trucks "in a series without
giving some warning'' ,,·as negligence. This is a proper
statmnent of the issue, particularly since nothing further
was asked of the trial court by counsel.
Another l'ador n1ust not be overlooked in connuenting upon the question of flare~. \Yillimu \Yhittaker, the
prineipal ,,·itnP~s on his own behalf and on behalf of the
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other appellants, admitted on cross-examination that he
had said upon his deposition that one of the men at the
scene had been carrying a lighted flare or fusee just a
moment before irnpact. This testimony had been given
in October, 1957, before the present respondents were
brought into the case by the amended complaint. At
trial, he said there were no lighted flares at the scene of
the accident, but his admission on deposition, which was
not explained away, created a factual conflict for the jury
to determine.
The jury could well have determined, from this evidence, that the respondent H. E. Woolf parked his truck
and walked back with a lighted flare or fusee in his hand
and, if this were found to be so, certainly this would have
served as an adequate warning to all oncoming traffic.
It is, therefore, difficult to see how appellants were
prejudiced, as to their claim against the respondents
\Voolf and North A1nerican Van Lines, by the alleged
errors of the trial court relating to flares.

The ren1aining contentions in appellants' brief center around the question of whether these respondents
parked on the highway when it was "practical" to have
parked elsewhere. The jury found they did not and an examination of the record convinces us that a contrary finding would not have been supported by the evidence.
The Highway Patrolman, truck driver Underwood
and appellant \Villiam Whittaker all testified to the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
smne effect -

that there was practically no shoulder,

that the trucks could not safely be driven on the steep,
rnuddy slope leading to the burrow pit and, in the words
of Whittaker, the trucks were "stopped in the highway
because they couldn't get off" (R. 187, 188).
The trial court asked the jury to determine this issue.
It did so. Its determination is substantially supported
by the evidence. X o reason has been offered here to
justify a rejection of that deterrnination.
CONCLU~IOX

Throughout this brief, respondents H. E. \Y oolf and
North Arnerican Van Lines have discussed the legal
principles involved in a case of this kind, even though
they remain strongly of the opinion that no facts were
proved, and none exist, which justify institution of suit
against them.
It has never been shown how \Yoolf. who parked
nwre than half a football field fr01n the point of impact,
could reasonabJ~~ have anticipated that a car, such as
\Vhittaker"s, would stop in the lane of travel, only to be
srnashed fron1 the rear b~~ an oncorning vehicle, when all
vehicles at the scene were fun~~ and plain]y visible for
rnore than a mile in either direction.
Even if \Voolf should have anticipated this chain of
events, it rmnains c01npletely unclear why he should have
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fore·wPn that his truck parked as it was, should have been
the ('oncern of the principal participants in this accident..
~iotorists are to be judged upon the standard of
reasonable foreseeability, in the light of the circumstances existing at the time of the event. Using this standard, a jur)· unanimously exonerated these respondents.
Even b~· the use of the all-encompassing gaze of hindsight,
appellants have failed to show that a different result
should have been reached.

The judgrnent is correct and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
and JOHN H. SNOW
701 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
AttoTneys joT Defendants and Respondents
H. E. W·oolf and NoTth AmeTican Van Lines
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